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LAW AND THE FAMILY


Privacy: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?

By Joel R. Brandes and Carole L. Weidman

New York Law Journal (p. 3, col. 1)
October 24, 1995

         HIGH-PROFILE CASES are fueling a lot of local newspapers these 
     days and, in the process, creating irresistible opportunities for 
     sensational reporting. The woes of those ``victimized'' has 
     triggered new interest in the right to privacy and the ongoing 
     debate as to just how much the public has a right to know. This 
     issue has seen battle before, but never has there been quite so much 
     attention devoted to the subject. When all is said and done, the 
     public's right to know ordinarily outweighs the privacy of 
     individuals. While matrimonial suits are sealed in accordance with 
     Domestic Relations Law (DRL) Sec.235(1) there is no existing cause 
     of action for a violation of the statutory mandate.
         DRL Sec.235(1) provides that an officer of the court with whom 
     the proceedings in a matrimonial action or a written agreement of 
     separation or an action or proceeding for custody, visitation or 
     maintenance of a child are filed, or before whom the testimony is 
     taken, or his clerk, either before or after the termination of the 
     suit, shall not permit a copy of any of the pleadings, affidavits, 
     findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment of dissolution, 
     written agreement of separation or memorandum thereof, testimony or 
     any examination or perusal thereof to be taken by any other person 
     than a party, or the attorney or counsel of a party, except by order 
     of the court.
         Subdivision (2) provides, that if the evidence on the trial of 
     the action is such that public interest requires that the 
     examination of the witnesses should not be public, the court may 
     exclude all persons from the room except the parties to the action 
     and their counsel. In such case the court may order the evidence, 
     when filed with the clerk, sealed, to be exhibited only to the 
     parties to the action or someone interested, on order of the court.
         This statute is founded on the premise that idle curiosity falls 
     short of a basis to examine or obtain copies of public records. 
     Likewise, creating public scandal as a reason just will not do. 
     Publication of the personal, painful and sometimes lurid details of 
     a divorce action fails to serve a useful purpose and tends to the 
     demoralization and corruption of society, by catering to a morbid 
     craving for sensationalism.*1
     
     Inherently Personal Nature
     
         The privilege generally accorded to reports of judicial 
     proceedings is unavailable to reports of matrimonial actions.*2 The 
     privacy accorded matrimonial matters is a recognition of the 
     inherently personal nature of these proceedings. Ill motivated 
     spouses are prevented from coercing the other spouse into a 
     settlement by threatening disclosure and publication of the 
     accusations contained in the pleadings or affidavits in the 
     matrimonial action.
         Through the years our courts have well defined the boundary 
     lines of DRL Sec.235. In Danziger v. Hearst Corp., where the 
     defendant had published an illegally obtained affidavit, the Court 
     of Appeals in upholding the constitutionality of DRL Sec.235, 
     observed that the legislation was addressed only to employees of the 
     court system and is limited in that regard. It does not prohibit 
     access to the minutes of the clerk of the court and thus does not 
     interfere with the right of any person to obtain information in 
     respect of the pendency or result of any matrimonial action. Nor 
     does the rule prohibit publication of the details of a matrimonial 
     action that are obtained from a source other than the files of the 
     court. The court did however, caution that ``such a publication is 
     actionable if defamatory.''*3
         Believing it worthy of repeating, the Court of Appeals again 
     expressed its view on the importance of the public's right to know 
     disavowing the individual's right to privacy under ordinary 
     circumstances. In Shiles v. News Syndicate Co.*4 the case involved a 
     defendant that had published a series of articles in The Daily News, 
     centering around allegations in a separation action, including the 
     wife's accusation that her husband had used his position as an 
     airline executive to entice applicants for jobs as stewardesses to 
     become ``women for his private harem,'' with the company footing the 
     bill, references to his ``sexual habits'' and encounters with other 
     women.
         The husband sought to recover for libel and invasion of privacy. 
     Defendant interposed affirmative defenses that the articles were 
     ``fair and true reports of judicial proceedings,'' privileged under 
     Civil Rights Law 74, and that the reports were true.
     
     Liability for Defamation
     
         In reversing an order denying a motion to dismiss those 
     defenses, the Court of Appeals held that one who had published and 
     disseminated the contents of the records of matrimonial proceedings 
     could not rely upon a defense of statutory privilege that the 
     articles were fair and true reports of judicial proceedings. It 
     recognized the constitutional right of the press to publish 
     allegations in a matrimonial suit, obtained from court files without 
     permission, but it warned that liability would be imposed for 
     defamatory publication.*5 Chief Judge Fuld observed in Shiles:This 
     does not mean that a party may not publish details of a divorce or 
     separation suit based on files obtained without a court order, or 
     that the courts would interfere with the constitutional right of any 
     one to publish such details, but it does mean that, if he does, he 
     will be held accountable and liable if those details are not 
     truthful.*6
         Great leeway has been afforded the press. This, coupled with the 
     void that exists in legislative redress for a violation of DRL 
     Sec.235, gave rise to a prominent case surrounding this subject. In 
     Freihofer v. Hearst Corp.*7 the Court of Appeals held, among other 
     things, that the publication of a newspaper article relating to the 
     details of confidential court files in matrimonial proceedings, does 
     not create a cause of action for invasion of privacy under Civil 
     Rights Law Sec.Sec.50 and 51.
         The action was brought to recover damages resulting from the 
     publication of three newspaper articles relating to a matrimonial 
     action between plaintiff and his wife. The complaint alleged that 
     the publications were in violation of DRL Sec.235 (1). The 
     publications reported some of the marital difficulties experienced 
     by plaintiff, one of the principals of a well-known company engaged 
     in the sale of baked goods. It was undisputed that the factual 
     content of the articles was obtained from confidential court records.
         One article captioned ``Freihofer's Fighting Over the Dough,'' 
     quoted extensively from affidavits filed in the marital suit in 
     connection with a pending application for exclusive occupancy of the 
     marital residence. Defendant admitted having reviewed court records 
     in connection with the preparation of the articles.
         In so doing, however, it denied any violation of DRL Sec.235, 
     contending that papers and pleadings in court actions, including 
     matrimonial suits, are readily available for inspection at the 
     county clerk's office and the Appellate Division; such an 
     examination is ``not an uncommon practice'' in the preparation of a 
     news story; and the news media ``regularly'' report with respect to 
     matrimonial proceedings that affect the public interest.
         Plaintiff alleged that the publications were improperly based 
     upon examination of matrimonial court records. As a result, he 
     claimed he suffered extreme emotional and physical distress, which 
     affected his business and private relationships, diminished his 
     standing in the community, subjected him to public scorn and 
     ridicule and impaired his social life. The plaintiff sought damages 
     for invasion of privacy under Civil Rights Law Sec.Sec.50 and 51, 
     for intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie 
     tort. There was no claim for defamation or that the content of the 
     articles was untruthful.
     
     No Independent Right
     
         The Court of Appeals rejected the tort claims and held that 
     there is no independent right to relief for invasion of privacy by 
     such publication because the Legislature has not established a cause 
     of action for violation of DRL Sec.235. DRL Sec.235 does not provide 
     for an independent cause of action against those who publish or 
     disseminate matter relating to a matrimonial action obtained in 
     violation of the statute.*8
         Section 4 of the Judiciary Law provides that the ``sittings of 
     every court within this state shall be public, and every citizen may 
     freely attend the same, except that, in all proceedings and trials 
     in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent 
     to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its 
     discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly 
     interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the 
     court.'' Neither it nor DRL Sec.235(2) require the court to close 
     the courtroom during a trial, even a custody trial.
         In Sprecher v. Sprecher,*9 a contested custody proceeding, the 
     father contended that the mother resided within a cult and that its 
     child-rearing practices were inimical to his son's best interest. 
     Although DRL Sec.235(2) authorized the court to close the courtroom 
     to the public in a custody proceeding, the court denied the mother's 
     motion to do so and granted a motion by Fox and CNN television 
     networks to permit TV in the courtroom for videotape coverage. The 
     court declined to restrain the parties or their counsel from 
     discussing the proceedings with representatives of the media. The 
     court balanced the best interest of the child with the publics right 
     to information as established in Judiciary Law Sec.4.
         In contrast, in Olesh v. Olesh,*10 an action for divorce where 
     the pleadings were ``replete with details'' involving alleged sexual 
     misconduct as well as cruel and inhuman treatment, the court denied 
     applications by Fox TV and Newsday for video coverage and still 
     photography. In drawing its conclusion, the court considered the 
     type of case, the age of the children and the type of testimony to 
     be elicited. Considerable attention was given to the factors in 22 
     NYCRR 131.4(c), an examination of DRL Sec.235(2) and Judiciary Law 
     Sec.4.
         In Anonymous v. Anonymous,*11 the Appellate Division affirmed an 
     order of the Supreme Court, which declined to grant plaintiff's 
     motion for an order excluding all persons from the hearing of the 
     custody matter but modified to change the caption to fictitious 
     names. It held that public access to court proceedings is strongly 
     favored, unless one establishes sufficient grounds to warrant 
     closing the court.
         In what promised to be a rough ride, the wife of producer David 
     Merrick sought complete anonymity in her divorce proceedings. In 
     Merrick v. Merrick,*12 she asked for an order sealing the court 
     file, closing the courtroom in all proceedings, directing that the 
     caption of the action be amended to Anonymous v. Anonymous and 
     restraining the husband and his attorneys or agents from discussing 
     the case with the media or disclosing case documents to third 
     persons.
         The Supreme Court held that the file in the action is considered 
     sealed pursuant to DRL Sec.235(1) and that it need not issue an 
     order directing compliance with the statute. It refused to issue an 
     order giving broader protection than does the statute. The case 
     revealed the generally recognized policy tilted in favor of public 
     access to the court, which has long plagued public figures. The 
     wife's emotional response to media coverage of the action could not 
     alone form the basis for closure of the courtroom. A prior order, 
     which constituted the law of the case, prohibited the husband's 
     attorneys from disclosing and discussing with the media any 
     documents submitted in the proceedings.
         The Supreme Court held that there was no public interest 
     favoring the presumption of an anonymous caption while a strong 
     public interest was present that tipped the balance to the 
     presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.
         In the supercharged atmosphere of matrimonial cases, the parties 
     are an easy mark for the press. This is especially true of the 
     children of those embroiled in the emotional wars often associated 
     with divorce. These children, along with their parents, wear the 
     scars of the scandal long after the battle is ended and the news is 
     history. A new era of concern should take a no-nonsense approach 
     toward protecting the rights of these individuals. Our legislators 
     need to stand up, take notice and act.
     
     
     notes
         (1) See Matter of Caswell, 18 R. I. 835, 836 cited in Stevenson 
     v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 614, 618, 96 NYS2d 751, affd 
     302 NY 81, 96 NE2d 187.
         (2) See, e.g., Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 304 N. Y. 244, 248; 
     Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co., supra.
         (3) 304 NY 244, 248.
         (4) Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 27 NY2d 9, cert denied 400 US 
     999.
         (5) Id., 27 NY2d, at p 15; see also Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 
     304 NY 142, 244, 248-249.
         (6) See Danziger v. Hearst Corp., supra; see, also, Matter of 
     United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77.
         (7) 65 NY2d 35 (1985)
         (8) See, Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., supra; Danziger v. Hearst 
     Corp., supra.
         (9) New York Law Journal, June 21, 1988, p. 21, col. 6, Sup.Ct., 
     NY Co. (Schackman, J);
         (10) (1986, Sup) 143 Misc2d 299, 540 NYS2d 123.
         (11) (1990, 1st Dept) 158 AD2d 296, 18 Media LR 1560.
         (12) (1992, Sup) 154 Misc2d 559, 585 NYS2d 989, affd Merrick v. 
     Merrick (1993, 1st Dept.) 190 AD2d 516, 593 NYS2d 192.
----------------
Joel R. Brandes and Carole L. Weidman have law offices in New York City 
and Garden City. They co-authored, with the late Doris Jonas Freed and 
Henry H. Foster, Law and the Family, New York (Lawyers' Co-Operative 
Publishing Co., Rochester, N.Y.) and co-authored the annual supplements.
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