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Castillo v Castillo, 597 F.Supp.2d 432 (D. Delaware, 2009)

 

In Castillo v Castillo, 597 F.Supp.2d 432 (D. Delaware, 2009) Petitioner Diana Terreros Castillo ("petitioner") filed a petition against respondent Faber Castillo, her former husband ("respondent") on July 29, 2008, seeking the return of her minor child. The parties were married in Colombia and on October 26, 1997, petitioner gave birth to child. At the time child was born, respondent resided in an apartment in Bogota, and petitioner and child resided with petitioner's parents outside of Bogota. Petitioner and child visited respondent in Bogota on weekends during child's first three years but continued to reside with petitioner's parents. When child was three years old, respondent moved to Venezuela. Respondent then moved to the United States, after which his contact with child consisted primarily of monthly telephone calls. The parties divorced in Colombia in 2002. They agreed to share parental rights and custody with respect to child, with petitioner as primary caregiver. The parties also agreed that child could travel outside Colombia for parental visits as long as child was returned after an agreed period of time. After the divorce, child continued to live with petitioner and petitioner's parents in Colombia near other family members. Almost all of child's extended family resides in Bogota. In January 2006, respondent's wife, a United States citizen, applied for an immigrant visa for child. In or around February 2007, respondent contacted petitioner to make arrangements for child to come to the United States. On February 27, 2007, after the parties worked together to complete the visa prerequisites, child was issued an immigrant visa, which authorized immigration to the United States until August 26, 2007. The child was to come to the United States to stay with respondent for approximately one month after which time child would return to Colombia. Respondent booked for child a round trip airline ticket leaving from Bogota on June 28, 2007, and returning to Bogota on July 29, 2007. On or about June 28, 2007, child traveled to the United States. After arriving in the United States, child received a "green card," authorizing child to reside in the United States as a permanent resident until July 19, 2017. On or about July 24, 2007, respondent informed petitioner that child would be remaining with him in the United States, an arrangement to which petitioner objected. Petitioner filed the action on July 29, 2008. On October 20, 2008, by order of the court, child met with attorney Kathleen McDonough. The purpose of this meeting was for McDonough to interview child to ascertain whether child is " 'well settled' in her present environment [,] ... objects to be returned to Colombia and, if so, ... has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of her views." The report from this meeting indicated that since the end of July 2007, child had lived with respondent and his wife, Santiago, whom child called "Lily," in their home at 2623 McClary Drive in Wilmington. Neither respondent nor Santiago had other children, though Santiago had several family members living nearby with whom child, respondent, and Santiago regularly spent time. Child participates in family activities with respondent and Santiago, including fishing trips on the Chesapeake and rides on the Cape May-Lewes Ferry. Child reported not playing much with children in her neighborhood because few are close to her in age. Child reported having many friends from Marbrook Elementary School, where she was enrolled. At school, child is placed in bilingual classes for some, but not all, subjects. Child expressed enthusiasm for school; she ranked in the 60th percentiles, approximately, for math and verbal skills and has received perfect or near perfect scores on several recent tests. Child has also developed fluency in English, a language she did not speak when she arrived in the United States in June 2007. After school and during the summer while respondent and Santiago are at work, child either attended daycare at the Latin American Community Center or is cared for at home by Santiago's aunt. Child has also received awards for perfect attendance during the second and fourth marking periods of the 2007-2008 school year. Child expressed a preference for her school and friends in the United States. Child reported that she speaks to petitioner by telephone occasionally, but did not express any sense of missing her life in Colombia. When discussing her life in Colombia, child recounted concerns about safety in the neighborhood where she lived with Petitioner and Petitioner's parents, explaining that she usually did not play outside due to those safety concerns. Child also reported spending much of her time at Petitioner's home alone and that she had few friends due to her school's distance from her home and the difference between her schoolmates' socioeconomic background and her own. Child reported that she received little help with her homework when she lived with petitioner and that her grades in school were worse than those she receives now. Child displayed "impressive" maturity for a girl about to turn eleven years old. She was bright, enthusiastic, and polite, and appeared well cared for. Child demonstrated clear understanding of the meeting's purpose and the need to answer questions truthfully. She answered questions in a straightforward manner and did not appear fearful or under duress. Child expressed a strong and unequivocal desire to remain in the United States.

The Court noted that even where a petitioner establishes that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained, the court may deny the petition if the respondent establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an exception set forth in Article 12 or 13 (besides 13b) of the Convention applies. See 42 U.S.C. s 11603(e)(2). One such exception, found in Article 12, applies where one year or more has elapsed between the wrongful retention or removal and the date of the petition, see 42 U.S.C. s 11603(f), and "it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment." Hague Convention, art. 12. Another exception, found in Article 13, applies where "the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." Hague Convention, art. 13

With respect to whether the "well-settled" exception applies, courts should focus on whether there is "substantial evidence of the child's significant connections to the new country." Courts have interpreted that guidance as a call to "consider any relevant factor informative of the child's connection with his or her living environment." Silvestri v. Oliva, 403 F.Supp.2d 378, 387 (D.N.J.2005). With respect to whether the "wishes of the child" exception applies, "[t]he Convention does not set an age at which a child is automatically considered to be sufficiently mature, rather the determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis." Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 279.

The Court noted that for the "well-settled" exception to apply, respondent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, as a threshold matter, one year or more elapsed between the wrongful retention and the date of the petition. The wrongful retention in this case occurred on either July 24, 2007, when petitioner first learned of and objected to respondent's retaining child, or July 29, 2007, when child did not take the return flight to Bogota. Petitioner filed her petition on July 29, 2008, which is at least one year after the wrongful retention. Accordingly, the court concluded that respondent has met his burden of proof with respect to whether the court may apply the "well-settled" exception. To determine whether child is well settled, the court examined the factors outlined in the case law. Child arrived in the United States over nineteen months ago when she was nine years old, and she was now eleven years old. Her residence has been stable, having lived since her arrival in the same home in Wilmington with respondent and Santiago. Her school attendance in the United States had been regular, with child having received two awards for perfect attendance during the 2007-2008 academic year. Moreover, child demonstrated improved grades and English fluency and had many friends at school. Respondent's employment was stable. Respondent and Santiago had full-time jobs, respondent having been with his employer for three years. While that necessitated that child attend daycare or be cared for by Santiago's aunt, respondent was actively involved in Child's life, assisting with homework and monitoring her television viewing and computer usage. Respondent and Santiago also participated with child in recreational activities, including fishing trips and ferry rides. The court found that child's activities with respondent and Santiago, along with her friends at school and her interactions with the members of Santiago's family living nearby, adequately compensated for the lack of extended family in the area and age-compatible playmates in her neighborhood. Child's immigration status was stable. She was a permanent resident with a "green card" and a Social Security card. Moreover, respondent testified at the August 28, 2008 hearing that he had applied for United States citizenship and expected, as of the time he testified, to be sworn in as a citizen in October 2008. He testified further to his understanding that, once he became a citizen, child would also become eligible for citizenship. While the court found that child's status as a permanent resident, standing alone, qualified as stable immigration status, the court considered respondent's citizenship efforts, and his apparent intention to make those efforts on child's behalf, as further evidence of child's stable immigration status. Finally, child had been able to maintain contact with petitioner. Respondent had done nothing to conceal child's whereabouts from petitioner and, since the time that child came to the United States, petitioner had known child's whereabouts and address and has been able to maintain phone contact. Considering these factors together, the court concluded that respondent had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that child was well settled in her new environment.

The Court noted that the Child had expressed a "strong and unequivocal" desire to remain in the United States, and the court found that child was old enough and mature enough for the court to take account of her views. Child was a bright eleven-year-old who, in her meeting with McDonough, displayed "impressive" maturity for a girl that age. She also demonstrated clear understanding of the meeting's purpose and the need to be truthful in answering questions. Child answered questions in a straightforward manner, and the record contained no evidence that her answers were merely expressions of someone else's opinion or otherwise the product of undue influence; McDonough reported that child appeared neither fearful nor under duress.

Furthermore, child expressed particularized objections to returning to Colombia, pointing out that, in Colombia, she received little help with homework, performed poorly in school (at least relative to her performance in the United States), was often unable to play outside due to safety concerns, spent much of her time at home alone, and had few friends. These particularized objections evidenced to the court that child's desire to remain in the United States is born of rational comparison between her life here and her life in Colombia. The court considered a desire based on such rational comparison to be a mature desire worth taking into account.

In this case, where child had become well settled in the United States and had attained an age and maturity sufficient for her desire to remain in the United States to be taken into account, the court concluded that it was consistent with the Convention to allow child to remain in the United States with respondent. Accordingly, in an exercise of its discretion, the court denied the petition.

  

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