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In Flynn v. Borders, 472 F.Supp.2d 906
( E.D. Ky. 2007) Petitioner Daphne Jude Flynn and Respondent Michael
Borders were married in Georgia on May 2, 1989, and divorced in Georgia
on March 23, 1998. They had two children, Jesse, born February 6, 1990
and Jenna, born March 3, 1994. Only Jenna was the subject of the
petition because Jesse was 16 years of age. In the final judgment and
decree of divorce dated March 23, 1998, the Superior Court of
Athens-Clarke County Georgia awarded custody of Jesse and Jenna to
Borders ("the Georgia Order"). In 1997, Flynn had taken a then
three-year-old Jenna to Ireland while then seven-year-old Jesse stayed
in Georgia with Borders. Borders allowed Jesse to visit Ireland in 1999.
According to Borders, Flynn would not allow Jesse to return to the
United States. When Borders went to Ireland in July of 2000, he
petitioned under the Hague Convention to have both children returned to
him in the United States based on the Georgia Order that awarded him
sole custody. Out of that proceeding, the High Court of Ireland issued
an order on March 30, 2001, in which it referenced a "settlement"
between the parties and a consent entered into by Borders and Flynn
("the High Court Order"). This order struck the Georgia Order, (granted
Flynn and Borders joint custody over Jesse and Jenna, granted Flynn
custody ten months of every twelve months, granted Borders custody from
June 15th to August 15th of each year, and required Borders to pay all
travel expenses for the children's travel to the United States. In her
affidavit, Flynn states that the High Court Order was "agreed on
consent" and that both parties were represented by counsel. As Borders
was "[g]iven no alternative but to live with the order, he did so" until
2006, when he kept Jenna from returning to Ireland after August 15,
2006. Borders claimed that having primary custody of Jenna in 2006 was
the part of his agreement with Flynn that was omitted from the High
Court Order, and he relied on the 1998 Georgia Order as the "only valid
custody order." Arguing that Borders has wrongfully retained Jenna here
in the United States, Flynn filed the petition under the Hague
Convention asking this Court to return Jenna to Ireland. Borders's
dissatisfaction with the High Court Order formed the basis of his
defense against Flynn's current petition. Flynn submitted a Declaration
of Habitual Residence to the Court in which she stated that Jenna was
living with her in Dublin from June 6, 1997, until June 24, 2006, when
she went to Kentucky to visit Borders. Jenna was born in the United
States, but except for visits to the United States to see Borders during
the summer, she lived with her mother in Ireland since 1997. The High
Court
Order limited Jenna's summer visits to the
United States to a duration of two
months or less. After her summer visits, she
always returned to Ireland to spend
the rest of the year with Flynn and attend
school. Borders did not dispute this time line and offered no relevant
evidence in response to support his contention that Jenna was a habitual
resident of the United States at the time she was retained by Borders in
August of 2006. Borders continues to rely on an agreement that is not
included in the High Court Order that Jenna would leave Ireland and
spend her secondary school years in the United States. But Borders
conceded that he and Flynn mutually agreed to the part of the High Court
Order that states that Jenna would spend most of each year and attend
school in Ireland. Essentially, Flynn and Borders agreed back in 2001
that Jenna's habitual residence was Ireland. Borders's present
intentions for Jenna, standing alone, did not serve to change her
habitual residence at the time
she was retained by Borders on August 15, 2006.
Based on the evidence presented by the parties, it appeared that Jenna
visited Borders once a year for the temporary purpose of spending the
summer with him in the United States and then returned to Ireland. This
was the pattern she had followed since 2002, when the High Court Order
states that she was to begin spending two months of each year with
Borders. The Court found that Jenna was a habitual resident of Ireland,
the country where she lived with her mother since 1997 and attended
primary school, immediately prior to her retention by Borders in the
United States. Flynn submitted the High Court Order as evidence that she
has joint custody of Jenna and that per this order, Borders only had
custody from June 15th to August 15th and his retention of Jenna past
August 15th is wrongful. Once it is determined that a party had valid
custody rights under the country of origin's laws, very little is
required of the applicant in support of the allegation that custody
rights have actually been or would have been exercised. The applicant
need only provide some preliminary evidence that he or she actually
exercised custody of the child, for instance, took physical care of the
child. Borders responded that the Georgia Order from 1998 that awarded
him sole custody of the children was the order that governs the parties'
custody dispute. But as noted by the Convention and several courts, in
reviewing this petition, the Court only has jurisdiction to decide the
merits of the abduction claim, not the merits of any underlying custody
dispute. This Court must look to the laws of the country of origin, that
is, Ireland, and decide whether Flynn was
exercising valid custody rights over Jenna.
Pursuant to the High Court Order, Flynn had valid custody rights under
the law of Ireland and would have been exercising such rights but for
Borders's retention of Jenna in August of 2006. Borders had not returned
Jenna to Ireland pursuant to that order; therefore, Flynn met her burden
of showing wrongful retention and the burden now shifts to Borders.
Borders argued that there is a grave risk that returning Jenna to Flynn
would expose her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place
her in an intolerable situation. The Article 13(b) "grave risk"
exception is "narrowly drawn." The risk must be "grave," and when
determining whether a grave risk of harm exists, courts must be
attentive to the purposes of the Convention. For example, the harm must
be "something greater than would normally be expected on taking a child
away from one parent and passing him to another"; otherwise, the goals
of the Convention could be easily circumvented. In general, respondents
who successfully rely on this exception have alleged sustained physical
or psychological abuse directed at the child. Borders submitted the
affidavit of his son, Jesse Borders. Other than Borders's allegations in
his response, this affidavit represented the only evidence to support
his argument that returning Jenna to Flynn will place her at risk for
abuse. The situations described by Jesse in his affidavit wer clearly
unsettling: his mother was frequently intoxicated; she may be smoking
marijuana; his mother slapped and hits Jenna "from time to time"; his
mother asks him to light her cigarettes for her; during an embarrassing
incident, his intoxicated mother sat on a vehicle so that her boyfriend
would not drive away; during their phone conversations, his mother
speaks to him in a degrading tone; his mother has stated to him and
Jenna that she wanted to kill his father; and his mother has told him to
lie to his father about her employment status in order to receive
additional child support. The affidavit undoubtedly painted a picture of
an unhappy home life for any child, but because the Court must determine
whether returning Jenna to her mother presents a grave risk of harm to
Jenna, only the allegations of physical abuse by Flynn towards the young
girl gave the Court pause. Based on the evidence presented-a single
allegation by Jesse, and notably, not Jenna-Borders had not shown by
clear and convincing evidence that returning Jenna to Flynn exposed her
to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. Jesse alleged that
his mother has physically abused his sister in the past, and the Court's
finding that the affidavit does not present clear and convincing
evidence of a grave risk of harm in no way discounted the serious nature
of such an allegation. But rather than stray into the forbidden
territory of analyzing which home would provide a better fit for Jenna,
this Court followed the weight of authority and concluded that Jesse's
allegation that his mother hit and slapped Jenna "from time to time" did
not carry Borders' s burden under the exception in Article 13(b). There
was no indication that Irish courts or the Irish authorities are
incapable or unwilling to adequately protect Jenna. See, e.g.,
Protections for Persons Reporting Child Abuse Act, 1998 (Act No.
49/1998) (Ir.) available at http:// www. irish statutebook. ie/ 1998_
49. html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007); The Commission to Inquire into
Child Abuse, http:// www. childabuse commission. ie/ index. html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2007). Based on one allegation from Jesse, the Court
would not place conditions on Jenna's return.
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