The 10^th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It noted that Ms. de Silva and Mr. Pitts, who were never married, were the natural parents of Paul Jonathan de Silva Pitts, who was born in Ardmore, Oklahoma, on February 16, 1993. Ms. de Silva, who was in the United States on a student visa, registered Jonathan as a citizen of her native Sri Lanka within the first few months of his life. Shortly after Jonathan's first birthday in February 1994, Ms. de Silva was notified by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that her visa had expired and that she was required to leave the United States by March 28, 1994. Ms. de Silva did not comply with this deadline. In May 1994, Mr. Pitts secured an order from the district court for Carter County, Oklahoma, enjoining either parent from removing Jonathan from that court's jurisdiction (ne exeat order). On July 5, 1994, and despite the Carter County ne exeat order of which she had notice, Ms. de Silva took Jonathan with her to Sri Lanka without Mr. Pitts's consent. Approximately one month later, the Carter County court awarded full custody of Jonathan to Mr. Pitts and, later that summer, held Ms. de Silva in contempt of the ne exeat order. Mr. Pitts eventually reunited with his son on a visit to Sri Lanka, a country which is not a signatory to the Hague Convention and could not provide Mr. Pitts an opportunity under the Convention to argue in the courts of that country that Ms. de Silva had wrongfully removed Jonathan from Oklahoma. On one of his visits to Sri Lanka, Mr. Pitts was served with papers relative to a second custody proceeding in Sri Lanka filed by Ms. de Silva. After being advised that the Sri Lankan courts would never enforce the Oklahoma custody order and that Ms. de Silva would almost surely be awarded custody, Mr. Pitts decided to agree to her custody demands, reasoning that, if he did not, she would likely flee again with the child. In 1996, Ms. de Silva obtained an order from a Sri Lankan court awarding her custody of Jonathan. In January 2003, after living with her son for almost nine years in Sri Lanka, Ms. de Silva fled to Canada where she was accepted as a refugee. Jonathan joined her in Canada a few weeks later. The parents had kept in contact over the years, and Mr. Pitts knew that his son had relocated to Canada. Mr. Pitts visited Jonathan in Canada on a couple of occasions, and Jonathan traveled from Canada to visit his father in Oklahoma at least once before the summer of 2005. In 2005, Jonathan had a round-trip ticket for a summer visit to Oklahoma that provided for his return in August 2005 to Canada, where he was scheduled to attend an end-of-summer camp. Instead of returning to his mother in Canada, however, Jonathan expressed his desire to stay with his father in Oklahoma. Jonathan remained in Oklahoma ever since with Mr. Pitts and his wife, respondent-appellee Sabrina Pitts. Ms. de Silva quickly objected to Jonathan's relocation to Oklahoma and petitioned a Canadian court to enforce the 1996 Sri Lankan custody order. She neither informed Mr. Pitts of this action, nor disclosed to the Canadian court the fact of the 1994 custody order from Oklahoma. In response to Ms. de Silva's petition, the Canadian court entered an ex parte order making a preliminary finding that Ms. de Silva was entitled to custody of Jonathan, ordering the return of the child to her, and setting the custody matter for further hearing after Mr. Pitts received notice. After the Canadian order was served on Mr. Pitts, he filed a response in the Canadian court which eventually stayed its earlier ex parte order. The Canadian matter remained abated. While the Canadian action was pending, Ms. de Silva filed a petition for return of child in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma seeking the return of Jonathan to her in Canada so that the Canadian courts can determine the matter of custody. Mr. Pitts filed an objection to the petition, informing the district court for the first time of the pre-existing Oklahoma order granting him custody of Jonathan.

The Court affirmed the conclusion of the district court that Jonathan should remain in Oklahoma while the custody matter is determined, via a different analytical path and relying on a different emphasis than the district court. Initially it noted that it was incorrect for the district court to apply the principles of the Hague Convention to Ms. de Silva's 1994 removal of Jonathan to Sri Lanka. The regulations implemented by the United States Department of State to govern Hague Convention actions apply only when a child is "taken to another country party to the Convention." 22 C.F.R. 94.7. "If a child is taken from a signatory country and is retained in a non-signatory country, it appears that there is no remedy under either ICARA or the Hague Convention." Thus, because Sri Lanka was not a signatory country, Mr. Pitts had no rights under the Convention to get a judicial determination that Ms. de Silva's 1994 removal of Jonathan to Sri Lanka was wrongful.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court also placed too much reliance upon the 1994 Carter County court order awarding Mr. Pitts full custody of Jonathan. Article 17 of the Hague Convention provides: The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State [here the United States] shall not be ground for refusing to return a child under this Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take account of the reasons for that decision in applying this Convention. The rationale for article 17 "is to prevent abductors from being able to rely upon ... a 'dead' decision taken prior to the removal but never put into effect." Further, the legal analysis provided by the State Department when the Convention was presented to the United States Senate in 1986 for ratification states that: "the alleged wrongdoer may [not] rely upon a stale decree awarding him or her custody, the provisions of which have been derogated from subsequently by agreement or acquiescence of the parties, to prevent the child's return under the Convention."

The Court noted that as an initial matter, Ms. de Silva, as the petitioner, was required to establish that Mr. Pitts's retention of Jonathan in Oklahoma was wrongful. To do that, she had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Pitts retained Jonathan away from Jonathan's habitual residence. She was also required to show she was exercising her parental custodial rights at the time of the wrongful retention (or at least would have exercised those rights but for the wrongful retention) under the laws of the country of Jonathan's habitual residence. It also noted that once a petitioner establishes that removal was wrongful, the child must be returned unless the respondent can establish a defense. There is also a consideration, left to the discretion of the judicial or administrative authority, which allows for refusal to order the return of a child where "the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." One of the primary areas in which a court may appropriately decide not to return a child occurs when a child of sufficient age and maturity objects to being returned to the country of habitual residence. The Convention provides in Article 13: "The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." The Perez-Vera Report expands on this idea: [T]he Convention also provides that the child's views concerning the essential question of its return or retention may be conclusive, provided it has, according to the competent authorities, attained an age and degree of  maturity sufficient for its views to be taken into account. In this way, the Convention gives children the possibility of interpreting their own interests. Of course, this provision could prove dangerous if it were applied by means of the direct questioning of young people who may admittedly have a clear grasp of the situation but who may also suffer serious psychological  harm if they think they are being forced to choose between two parents. However, such a provision is absolutely necessary given the fact that the Convention applies, ratione personae, to all children under the age of sixteen; the fact must be acknowledged that it would be very difficult to accept that a child of, for example, fifteen years of age, should be returned against its will. Moreover, as regards this particular point, all efforts to agree on a minimum age at which the views of the child could be taken into account failed, since all the ages suggested seemed artificial, even arbitrary. It seemed best to leave the application of this clause to the discretion of the competent authorities. Perez Vera Report at 433, para. 30. 

Jonathan was thirteen years old at the time of the district court hearing. He recently turned fourteen. The 10^th Circuit held that in applying the "age and maturity" exception, a court must not focus solely on the general goal of the Convention--to protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal--but must also carefully determine that the particular child " 'has obtained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.' " Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 247 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Convention, 1988 WL 411501, art. 13). The Convention contains no age limit for applying the exception, and if a court determines that the youngster's opinion is the product of undue influence, the child's wishes are not taken into account. "The magistrate judge inter viewed Jonathan in camera with her law clerk and the court reporter present, but without the parents or their counsel in attendance. Jonathan indicated that, while he has "a lot of friends up in Canada," and gets along with his sister who lives there, he had also made friends in Ardmore where he is on the football team and the wrestling team. He described the Pitts's house in Ardmore as "really big" and "a great place" where he has a computer and everything he needs for school. He indicated that he wanted to remain in Ardmore because he thought the school was better. Jonathan and his father had discussed relocation on a prior visit, but Jonathan was undecided then about staying with his father. By 2005, however, Jonathan said he felt more at home in Ardmore and wished to stay. As a result of her interview, the magistrate judge concluded: This Court observed Jonathan to be a bright, expressive child with a well-developed understanding of his situation and the positions of his parents. He has attained an age and degree of  maturity to so consider his views. Unlike Petitioner [Ms. de Silva], this Court did not find Jonathan to be particularly swayed by lavish gifts and wealth in forming an opinion that the schools were better in Oklahoma, he enjoyed his friends and activities and his home. He is well-settled in his environment in Oklahoma and expressed his desire to remain in Oklahoma with Pitts without apparent adult indoctrination. Allowing him to remain with Pitts while an Oklahoma court determines custodial issues between his parents is in his best interests at this time."

The 10^th Circuit found no error in the district court's ultimate conclusion that Jonathan should remain in Oklahoma while Oklahoma courts decide the custody matter. It held that, under the unusual circumstances of this case, it was appropriate to refuse repatriation to Canada solely on the basis of Jonathan's desire to stay in Oklahoma.