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| Whallon v.
Lynn, 356 F.3d 138 (1st Cir.,2004)
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In Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138 (1st
Cir.,2004) the mother appealed from an award of attorney's fees and
expenses to petitioner-appellee, who brought an action to secure the
return of his child from the United States to her habitual residence,
Mexico, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. The Circuit Court ordered the child's mother, to return
the child in Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir.2000). The district
court granted petitioner's request for fees and costs after it reduced
the request for expenses by more than seventy percent (from $23,463.17
to $6,929.78). After considering the requested fees for both United
States and Mexican counsel, the court found the claimed 234.1 hours
"extreme even granting that this is an extraordinarily contentious
case." It reduced the fees awarded by one half (from $41,403 to
$20,701.50). The court then considered respondent's claim that an award
of the magnitude requested was inappropriate because she was unable to
pay for it, living on loans from family and friends. It then further
reduced the legal fees by 25 percent (from $20,701.50 to $15,526.13). It
cited two cases that have considered a respondent's limited financial
means and the economic impact on the children in reducing a fee award.
See Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373-74 (8th Cir.1995) (46 percent
reduction because of respondent's "straitened financial circumstances");
Berendsen v. Nichols, 938 F.Supp. 737, 739 (D.Kan.1996) (15 percent
reduction; "a fee award which unduly limited respondent's ability to
support his children would be 'clearly inappropriate' "). In sum, the
court's reductions of fees and expenses amounted to 65 percent (from
$64,866.17 to $22,455.91). In granting petitioner's motion, the court
specified that one firm, Miles & Stockbridge, be awarded $13,973.91
(covering both allowed fees and expenses), and that the Mexican firm of
Tucker & Cinquegrana be awarded $8,482.
The Circuit Court held that the standard
governing review is abuse of discretion. This is consistent with such
cases dealing with attorney's fee awards as Larch v. Mansfield Mun.
Elec. Dep't, 272 F.3d 63, 75 (1st Cir.2001). Respondent asserted that
the court "refused to delve as deeply as was necessary" into
respondent's financial condition to protect the child's best interests,
and that it refused to consider petitioner's flagrant failure to make
support payments in an amount alleged to exceed the amount of the fee
award. The Court of Appeals noted that the district court has the duty,
under 42 U.S.C. 11607(b)(3) , to order the payment of necessary expenses
and legal fees, subject to a broad caveat denoted by the words, "clearly
inappropriate." It agreed with the Berendsen and Rydder courts that
preserving the ability of a respondent to care for her child is an
important factor to consider. It also read the statute as giving the
district court broad discretion in its effort to comply with the Hague
Convention consistently with our own laws and standards. It held that it
was clear from the statute that the respondent has the burden to
establish that a fee/expense order would be clearly inappropriate. It
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court did
not accept respondent's belated invitation to use a fee award
determination arising out of Hague Convention proceedings as a means of
rectifying past violations of child support obligations. The focus
remained on the question whether respondent had clearly established that
it was likely that her child would be significantly adversely affected
by the court's award. The only evidence given of respondent's ability to
provide for her child was the affidavit she submitted to the court over
two years earlier, on November 27, 2000, and never supplemented. This
two page document contained four averments of a general or conclusory
nature: (1) she was "financially unable to contribute to [petitioner's]
attorneys' fees;" (2) she has "not been employed outside of the home for
over a year;" (3) she has "no source of income;" and (4) she has
"obtained loans from family and friends" for support.
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