Frier v. Frier, 985 F.Supp.2d 710 (E. D. Mich. 1997)

In Frier v. Frier, 985 F.Supp.2d 710 (E. D. Mich. 1997), the prevailing plaintiff in an action under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act requested attorneys fees and costs. The District Court held that the attorney fee of $12,112.50, representing the 80.5 hours of attorney time at $150 per hour, were reasonable. Generally, a party is not entitled to recover expenses that are merely incident to preparation of cases and are part of the office overhead. The Clerk’s fee of $360 was not recoverable as part of the attorney fee award, where the clerk’s services appeared to be hours spent picking up from and delivering items to the courts, libraries and opposing counsel’s office. Photocopying costs are allowed as costs to the extent that copies are used as court exhibits or were furnished to the court or opposing counsel. Money spent to copy documents for a litigant’s own use are not recoverable. The interpreters’ cost was not recoverable, where the interpreters were not court appointed.
Consultation costs are not allowed under the fee shifting statute or under the federal cost statute. The plaintiff was entitled to transportation costs in the amount of $2,422 related to the return of the child to Israel.
It is well settled that the “lodestar” approach is the proper method for determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Hensly v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 380 (6th Cir.1993). Applying the lodestar approach, the most useful starting point is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by reasonably hourly rate. There is a strong presumption that this lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. However, there remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward. Hours may be cut for duplication, padding or frivolous claims. In complicated cases, involving many lawyers, deducting a small percentage of the total hours may be used to eliminate duplication of services. Id. The district court must base its decision on the affidavits of counsel along with supporting documents including an accurate summary of contemporaneous time records with dates, number of hours expended, by whom, and a specific explanation of the action taken.
Recoverable costs as defined in 28 U.S.C. 1920, LR 54.1 of the Eastern District of Michigan and the Bill of Costs Handbook include:
1) Fees of the clerk and marshall;
2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessary obtained for use in the case;
3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
Title 28 U.S.C. 1821(b) limits witness fees authorized by 1920(3). Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987). The district court may decline to award the costs listed in the statute but may not award costs omitted from the list. Crawford Fitting at 442, 107 S.Ct. At 2497-98.
Reasonable telephone costs are recoverable under a fee shifting statute. Northcross, supra, 611 F.23d at 639.
Dr. Dov I. Frimer is an Advocate before the Israel Bar Association, licensed to practice law in the state of New York, wrote an eleven page handwritten letter concerning Israeli law which was submitted to the Court with a copy given to Defendant. Petitioner claimed that the fees incurred relative to the services of Dr. Frimer were for consultation.
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover the fees and costs incurred by Dr. Frimer. Dr. Frimer did not represent Plaintiff in the action before the Court. Plaintiff had not submitted any authority which allowed the Court to award fees and costs incurred by an attorney who does not represent a party in an action before the Court. As Dr. Frimer was considered a consultant to Plaintiff’s attorney, consultation costs are not allowed under a fee shifting statute or 1920. Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 652 F.Supp. 192, 197 (E.D.Mich.1986).
Dr. Frimer may be considered an expert witness on Israeli law in this matter, 28 U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920(e) allow for taxation of witness fees for witnesses who testified at trial. Dr. Frimer did not appear in person before the Court to testify at a trial or hearing. There is no authority allowing a prevailing party to recover expert witness fees of a witness who did not testify at trial.
residing in Utah, but the decree further granted liberal and extensive visitation rights to Joe. The decree required Joe to pay child support. The decree provided that Maria could “take the minor child to Germany during the summer months to visit with her family”, but limited the right of Maria or Joe to permanently remove the child from the United States without advanced notice. T”he decree required that te “parties shall provide one another with ... at least 90 days notice if either party intends to move from the United States.”
After Joe had once been jailed for failing to pay child support, Maria, without sending Joe the required 90-day notice, left Utah, traveled to Germany with Stephan and after that refused to return to the United States with the boy. During a hearing in Germany, Maria admitted that she knew she was violating the Utah court’s divorce decree when she took Stephan to Germany. She told the German court: “it is correct that I didn’t properly inform [Stephan’s] father before we left on December 5, 1994" and “I knew that if I had given formal notice, I would not have been able to leave with Stephan.”
On April 26, 1995, Joe filed with the Utah court an ex parte petition seeking the return of Stephan. On April 27, 1995, the Utah court, acting by the same judge who had granted the earlier divorce decree, entered an order. It provided that Maria was to deliver Stephan to Germany’s Central Authority, that the Central Authority was to deliver the child to the American State Department and the State Department “shall allow the child to be delivered to [Joe at a residence in Utah.] If Maria failed to comply with the order, the court further ordered that any law enforcement officer “is hereby ordered to enforce these orders by picking up the minor child and delivering the minor” according to the order. The Utah court decided that Maria had violated the court’s prior divorce decree by taking Stephan to Germany and that Maria’s actions permitted the court to compel the return of the child pursuant to the provisions of Utah law, the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.