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In
Sealed Appellant v Sealed
Appellee --- F.3d —, 2004
WL 2915345 (5th Cir.(Tex.)) the father of two Australian-born children
petitioned for their return to Australia under the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The District Court denied
the petition holding that he was not exercising custody rights at the time
of their removal. The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning from Friedrich
II and held that in the absence of a ruling from a court in the child's
country of habitual residence, when a parent has custody rights under the
laws of that country, even occasional contact with the child constitutes
"exercise" of those rights. To show failure to exercise custody rights, the
removing parent must show the other parent has abandoned the child. It held
that under the law of Australia, the children's country of habitual
residence, the father was "exercising" his rights of custody when the mother
removed the children. It also held that no custody suit need be pending for
the mother's removal to be wrongful under the Convention.
The appellant was the
Australian-citizen father of two Australian-born children, ages two and
four. Appellee, the children's mother, was an American citizen who lived in
Australia for approximately nine years before returning to the United States
in 2003. The father and mother were never married, but lived together with
their elder child for approximately 18 months before the mother and child
moved out. At that time, the mother was pregnant with her second child with
the father. He never had primary physical custody of either child. Both
parties agreed that the father maintained contact with his children after
they separated. The father claimed he visited the children multiple times a
week; the mother, only about four or five times a year. The father gave the
mother money for child support, although the amount and regularity was
unclear. In early September 2003, the father, mother, and their children had
dinner together in Australia, at which time the mother told father she
planned to take their children on a holiday to visit her parents in Texas.
He understood the children would be there for a month before returning to
Australia and believed the trip was planned for February 2004. He signed the
necessary papers for the children to receive Australian passports. He did
not consent to the children's permanent removal from Australia. The Mother
left Australia with the children in early September 2003, with no intention
of returning. Several days later, the Father discovered the Mother had
permanently left the country when he found her telephone line disconnected
and her house vacated. He attempted to communicate with her in Texas. He was
able to speak with her parents and ascertain that the children were staying
at their home, but she refused to speak to him. With the help of the
Australian International Family Law Section of the Attorney-General's
Department, Father filed the necessary documents to begin the process of
having the children returned to Australia under the Convention.
In April 2004 he
petitioned the United States District Court for the children’s return to
Australia. At the hearing, the Mother testified, among other things, that
the father paid token support for the children and occasionally visited
them. He testified, that he paid child support to Mother weekly, that he
visited the children at least weekly and that he did not consent to the
children's permanent removal from Australia. The mother testified as an
affirmative defense that the father was not exercising his custody rights,
so the removal was not wrongful.
The Court of Appeals held
that the District court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and
its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. When there is no formal custody
agreement between parents, courts must apply the laws of the country of the
child's habitual residence to determine if the non-removing parent had
"rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. Under
Australian law, in the absence of any orders of court, each Australian
parent of a child has custody rights as to the child. In the absence of any
orders of court, each Australian parent of a child is a joint guardian and a
joint custodian of the child, and guardianship and custody rights involve
essentially the right to have and make decisions concerning daily care and
control of the child.
The Court held that:"
the determination
whether a party is exercising custody rights closely parallels the
determination of the nature and dimension of those rights. American
courts have interpreted "exercise" broadly. See Friedrich II, 78
F.3d at 1063; Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F.Supp.2d 603
(E.D.Va.2002); Freier v. Freier, 969 F.Supp. 436 (E.D.Mich.1996);
Sampson v. Sampson, 267 Kan. 175, 975 P.2d 1211 (1999). Friedrich II
held: "The only acceptable solution, in the absence of a ruling from
a court in the country of habitual residence, is to liberally find
'exercise' whenever a parent with de jure custody rights keeps, or
seeks to keep, any sort of regular contact with his or her child".
Id. 1065.
[I]f a person has
valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of the
child's habitual residence, that person cannot fail to "exercise"
those custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that
constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child. Once it
determines that the parent exercised custody rights in any manner,
the court should stop-- completely avoiding the question whether the
parent exercised the custody rights well or badly. These matters go
to the merits of the custody dispute and are, therefore, beyond the
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Id. 1066 (footnote
and citation omitted; emphasis added)."
The Court of Appeals
adopted the reasoning from Friedrich II. It held that in the absence of a
ruling from a court in the child's country of habitual residence, when a
parent has custody rights under the laws of that country, even occasional
contact with the child constitutes "exercise" of those rights. To show
failure to exercise custody rights, the removing parent must show the other
parent has abandoned the child.
In determining whether a
parent was exercising his or her rights of custody under the Hague
Convention American courts have interpreted the term "exercise" broadly. If
a person has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of
the child's habitual residence, that person cannot fail to "exercise" those
custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute
clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child. In the absence of a ruling
from a court in the child's country of habitual residence, when a parent has
custody rights under the laws of that country, even occasional contact with
the child constitutes "exercise" of those rights, To show failure to
"exercise" custody rights, within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the removing parent must
show the other parent has abandoned the child.
The Court of Appeals
defers to the district court's credibility determinations and will not
disturb them unless a review of the evidence leaves the appellate court with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Under the law
of Australia, the removed children's country of habitual residence, the
father was "exercising" his rights of custody when mother removed the
children to Texas, within the meaning of the Hague Convention. Although the
parties disagreed about the amount of contact between father and children,
the mother conceded that he visited the children about five times a year and
paid child support to her, and there was no evidence in the record showing
he completely abandoned the children.
Upon de novo review of the
district court's application of law, the court held the district court erred
in its conclusion that Mother showed, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the father was not exercising his custody rights. At oral argument she
conceded that the Father's contacts with the children would constitute
"exercise" under the Friedrich II standard, if applicable; and there was no
evidence in the record showing Father completely abandoned his children. The
Court held that the Father did not abandon his children. By visiting his
children and contributing to their financial support, the Father was
exercising his custody rights at the time Mother removed the children from
their country of habitual residence.
It vacated the order and
remanded to the district court for a determination of the logistics of the
children's prompt return to Australia.
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