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Kufner v Kufner, 440 F.Supp.2d 491 (D.R.I., 2007)

 

In Kufner v Kufner, 440 F.Supp.2d 491 (D.R.I., 2007)  Petitioner Dominik Kufner sought the return of his two children, J.K. and M.K., to Germany. On or about January 22, 2007, the children were taken by their mother, respondent Tina Kufner, from Germany to Rhode Island. Ms. Kufner contended that the children were not wrongfully removed, and that, in the event that they were, she and the children are entitled to remain in Rhode Island because the children, if returned to Germany, would be subject to a grave risk of harm. Tina Kufner was born in Cumberland, Rhode Island and was a United States citizen. In 1989, she met Dominik Kufner, a German citizen, in Hong Kong and in 1996 they were married and began to live in Munich, Germany. Munich was the site of Mr. Kufner's successful family textile business, which he partly managed. On September 3, 1998, two years after they moved to Munich, J.K. was born, and then, on December 9, 1999, their second child, M.K., was born. Both children were dual citizens of Germany and the United States. Although the family lived exclusively in Germany, they made frequent trips to Rhode Island, especially around the holidays, to visit Ms. Kufner's family. In June or July of 2005, the parents separated, moved out of their house, and by September had acquired two smaller homes. During this separation period, the parents informally agreed to share time with the children. Mr. Kufner traveled frequently, and when he was gone the children resided with Ms.Kufner; when Mr. Kufner returned, the children spent time with him.

In early 2006, however, a number of events caused an escalation in tension between the parents and a breakdown in their relationship. Ms. Kufner testified that in January 2006 she became aware of a number of photographs Mr. Kufner had taken of the children that caused her significant concern. The photographs were taken in September 2005 in Mr. Kufner's house. The controversial pictures were contained in a folder titled "naked boys in Moeribach." A total of 49 pictures were taken during this "event," although only 43 were submitted to the court. (The last six were apparently pictures of the children eating on the floor "like dogs," but Ms. Kufner did not rely on these photographs for her Article 13(b) defense). The majority of photographs-- thirty-nine of them–were relatively innocuous pictures of the children playing and laughing, naked, in the living room of Mr. Kufner's house. One picture of those thirty-nine also shows that the children's au pair, Ms. Cain, was present. Four of the photographs, were significantly more graphic in nature. In one, one of the boys is bent over, looking through his legs at the camera. In this pose, his buttocks and genitals are clearly displayed. In another, one of the boys is bent over a couch with his genitals and buttocks the only visible portions of his body; it appeared that he was unaware that the photograph is being taken, although his face is not visible. In a third, one of the boys is pictured lying down, with his buttocks clearly displayed. Finally, a fourth photograph depicts one of the boys bent over the couch again, with his buttocks clearly exposed. In early February, Mr. Kufner spent ten days alone with the children during "ski week." This vacation caused Ms. Kufner a great deal of anxiety because she was unable to see the children. Then, likely in late February 2006, the children began displaying certain observable physical symptoms, including bed-wetting, nervous eye twitching, sleeplessness and nighttime crying and screaming. In addition, Ms. Kufner claimed that the children played with the foreskin of their penises and engaged in a "pee-pee dance." These symptoms caused both parents significant anxiety, and each blames the other for their onset. On February 21, 2006, Ms. Kufner's lawyer in Germany sent a letter to Mr. Kufner requesting an explanation of at least two of the photographs, includingone of the most graphic, and when she did not receive an adequate response, Ms. Kufner petitioned for sole custody of the children in the Weilhelm Local Court, Domestic Division ("German court" or "court"). In response, and because he feared Ms. Kufner would leave the country with the children, Mr. Kufner sought and received an ex parte order requiring Ms. Kufner to deposit the children's passports with the court. The order was by its terms effective until the court made a final determination in the custody matter. On March 1, 2006, the parents attended a court proceeding during which the children were heard by the court in camera. The hearing resulted in a published opinion divided into two relevant sections. The first, under the heading "Order," stated, in full: Both parties shall exercise the parental custody jointly. The parental custody of both parties shall be restricted to the extent that neither party is entitled to establish for their children a domicile and/or permanent residence abroad without the consent of the other party.

Thereafter Mr. Kufner petitioned for sole custody of the children. Ms. Kufner claimed she then became aware, possibly in the middle of August, of a number of additional photographs that caused her even greater concern. After viewing the photographs, she submitted them on August 25, 2006, through her lawyer, to the court in a petition seeking to suspend Mr. Kufner's visitation rights with the children or in the alternative to permit only supervised visitation. Four days later, on August 29, 2006, Ms. Kufner submitted a petition to the court seeking consent to relocate the children to the United States. On October 18, 2006, without an oral hearing, the court issued a temporary "Ruling on Access and Contact," to be followed until the court determined the final merits of the custody case. That order held that the father was entitled to access and contact to his children and stated that there was no sufficient and adequate indication to the effect that the father has overstepped any boundaries or taken any inappropriate approach in bringing up his children. It cannot be inferred from the photographs in dispute that the father is a pedophiliac [sic] or inappropriately encourages any sexualised behaviour [sic] of his children. Incidentally, the Respondent has known of the existence of these photographs for a long time, without her taking any offence at them at considering them to be an obstacle to the father's access and contact. On November 12, 2006 the court issued an injunction structuring the visitation rights of Mr. Kufner over the December holidays. The injunction additionally forbid Ms. Kufner from traveling to the United States with the children and ordered that she deposit the children's American passports with her lawyer. The latter provision was amended in a December 13, 2006, order requiring Ms. Kufner to deposit the American passports at the district offices of DYF. On December 20, 2006, the court issued a decision memorializing the parents' agreements in the dispute. Both parents, the children and an interpreter were present, and the court heard from both children in the absence of the parties. A record of the decision reported that the parties agreed to a settlement in court that formalized the visitation rights laid out in the November 12 interim order, required Ms. Kufner to deposit the children's American passports with the United States Consulate, and enjoined Ms. Kufner from traveling to the United States over the Christmas holidays. In late January 2007, and in direct violation of the German court's order, Ms. Kufner acquired the children's American passports from the Consulate and, without notifying Mr. Kufner, left Germany with the children for the United States. After determining that Ms. Kufner and the children had relocated to the United States, Mr. Kufner flew to Rhode Island to initiate this case. While all the parties were in Rhode Island, however, Mr. Kufner sought an order in Germany awarding him sole custody. On February 16, 2007, he successfully obtained a temporary order awarding him full custody.

Additionally, by leaving Germany in violation of a court order, Ms. Kufner has exposed herself to the possibility of criminal charges if she returns. It was undisputed that M.K. and J.K.'s habitual residence at the time of removal was Munich, Germany. Ms. Kufner argued that Mr. Kufner did not have custody of the children as evidenced by the German court's award of visitation and access rights to him, but not to her. She therefore contended that she must have had sole custody and he must have had only visitation rights. However, this claim was clearly belied both by the specific custody order in this case and by German custody law in general. The Court found that Mr. and Ms. Kufner were separated but not divorced at the time Ms. Kufner left and that they were, by order of court, exercising joint custody over the children.

Although each party had sought sole custody, the court order of March 1, 2006  "concerning parental custody" makes clear that "[b]oth parties shall exercise the parental custody jointly." This order was never superceded, explicitly or implicitly, and is therefore controlling. Blackletter German law confirms this understanding: "[w]here the parents are married at the birth of the child, both acquire the parental care automatically without any further act being required or even possible. Parental care thus continues until ended by law (e.g.[,] at the death of the parent) or by Court order. The parents' divorce or separation thus remains without influence on the continuing parental care for the child." Peter Gottwald, et al., Family and Succession Law in Germany 79 (2001).

Mrs. Kufner argued that there was a grave risk of harm if the children were returned. It involved a combination of the photographs taken by Mr. Kufner, the physical symptoms displayed by the children, and the alleged inadequacy of the German court's investigation. Ms. Kufner alleged that the existence of these factors in combination would create a grave risk of harm if the children were returned to Germany. In effect, Ms. Kufner claimed that Mr. Kufner engaged the children in a photo session disguised to create child pornography; that the children feel abused by this (hence the symptoms); and finally that the German courts and child welfare agencies were incompetent or otherwise unable to see what Ms. Kufner perceives as an obviously harmful situation. Consequently, Ms. Kufner feared that she will be unable to protect the children in the future. Thus, she argued that  only the system of child protection available in the United States can protect the children from their father, and that return of the children to Germany would create a grave risk and an intolerable situation. The Court held that where Ms. Kufner sees smoke, however, there is not only no fire, but there is not even smoke. Here, the overwhelming absence of any evidence suggesting the children were subjected to sexual abuse or, if returned, will be abused combined with the thoroughness and adequacy of the German court's investigation compelled the conclusion that there is no grave risk (let alone any risk at all) that return to Germany would expose the children to any physical or psychological harm or would otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation.

Article 13 also provides that a court may "refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." Hague Convention, art. 13. Ms. Kufner insisted that because the children have expressed a clear desire to remain in the United States with their mother, the Court should decline to return the children to Germany. It is true that this clause in Article 13 would provide a potentially independent vehicle preventing the children's return to Germany if their views were sufficiently considered and mature. However, a court is not compelled to defer to the children's views, and it may disregard them entirely in appropriate circumstances. See Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, No. 2:03-cv-1613, 2006 WL 2466095 (W.D.Pa. Aug.25, 2006) (noting that the application of the "wishes of the child exception" is left "wholly to the discretion of the district court"). The Court decided to assume that, if asked, the children would express their desire to remain in the United States with their mother. However, the evidence clearly indicated that this desire emerged only after Ms. Kufner had wrongfully retained the children in the United States. The GWG and Department of Youth and Families reports indicate that, when asked in Germany, the children expressed their desire to remain in Germany. Based on the inconsistent wishes of the children--when in Germany they wish to remain in Germany, and when in the United States they wish to remain in the United States--and in light of the possibility that their "wishes" are the product of a parent's invidious influence, as well as their young age, lack of maturity and susceptibility to parental influence, the Court exercised its discretion to disregard the children's wishes in determining whether Article 13 should result in an order refusing to return the children to Germany.

The court noted that a determination that a respondent has not proved an Article 13(b) defense and that the children can be returned to the country of habitual residence will not, in every case, automatically result in the return of the children. Undertakings, which are "based neither in the Convention nor in the implementing legislation of any nation, are a type of safeguard that courts may impose in order to help ensure that a potential risk of harm does not materialize. The consideration of undertakings "allows courts to conduct an evaluation of the placement options and legal safeguards in the country of habitual residence to preserve the child's safety while the courts of that country have the opportunity to determine custody of the children within the physical boundaries of their jurisdiction." However, the use of undertakings must be narrow in scope, and "must focus on the particular situation of the child" and on whether some set of requirements "will suffice to protect the child." Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 22. The Court noted that because undertakings "raise serious comity concerns," Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 23, and are not enumerated within the Hague Convention, their use has generated a considerable amount of controversy. Some cases view the use of undertakings favorably. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219 ("Given the strong presumption that a child should be returned, many courts, both here and in other countries, have determined that the reception of undertakings best allows for the achievement of the goals set out in the Convention while, at the same time, protecting children from exposure to grave risk of harm."); Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir.1999) ("Blondin I") (encouraging the consideration of the "range of remedies that might allow both the return of the children to their home country and their protection from harm, pending a custody order in due course") (emphasis omitted). And, at least one case has expressed skepticism over the use of undertakings except in very limited situations. See Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 22. In Danaipour, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit analyzed the use of undertakings from the perspective of international comity and concluded that undertakings which "[c]ondition[ ] a return order on a foreign court's entry of an order" likely offend notions of comity because they would "smack of coercion of the foreign court." Id. at 23 (citing Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference on Private International Law 120 for the proposition that "the return of a child cannot be made conditional upon [a] decision or other determination being provided [by the court of the country of habitual residence].") The court in Danaipour also doubted whether undertakings that "go beyond the conditions of return" would be enforceable in the home country, especially in countries where contempt of injunctive power is absent. Id. The court held that some narrowly-focused undertakings that do not offend notions of comity were necessary and appropriate to ensure that the children would not be exposed to a risk of harm upon return to Germany. Therefore, Petitioner was ordered, consistent with representations made by him under oath and to the Court, to secure the dismissal of any and all criminal charges currently pending against Respondent in Germany; Petitioner was directed to act expeditiously to obtain the prescribed medical procedures for M.K. in Germany. Until the appropriate German court makes specific determinations regarding custody and access and visitation rights, and consistent with his representations to the Court, Petitioner was directed not to unreasonably oppose Respondent's efforts to obtain reasonable access and visitation with the children, nor shall he oppose any effort on her part to obtain appropriate counseling to increase her visitation up to the point of and including joint custody.

 

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