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Zajaczkowski v. Zajaczkowska, 932 F.Supp. 128 (D. Maryland)

 

In Zajaczkowski v. Zajaczkowska, 932 F.Supp. 128 (D. Maryland) an action was filed under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. The District Court noted that the rules of procedure applicable to ordinary civil cases would seem to be at odds with the Convention and ICARA's premium on expedited decision-making. In the Court's view the writ of habeas corpus, while not mentioned in ICARA, whose office is to test the legality of an alleged wrongful detention. Habeas Corpus should issue since the action translates rather easily into a test of wrongful abduction or retention within the meaning of the Convention. "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by ... the district courts ... within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. 2241(a). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are only applicable to proceedings for habeas corpus "to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions." Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(2); see also Ruby v. United States, 341 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 1877, 16 L.Ed.2d 689 (1966) (ordinary rules of civil procedure do not apply in a habeas proceeding). The court held that the petition would be treated as an application for writ of habeas corpus and thus respondent, who had not yet been served, would be ordered to appear before the court to show cause why writ should not issue. The court noted that there are, however, no special procedural rules prescribing the course of action for a federal court when a petition under the Convention and ICARA is filed, and the legislative history of ICARA provides little by way of enlightenment. The Convention contemplates quick action; a period of six weeks from the date of the filing of the petition to the court's
decision is envisioned. See Convention art. 11 ("If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant ... shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay."); 22 C.F.R. 94.6(h) (1995) (requiring United States authorities, upon request by a petitioner, to seek a report on the status of court action when no decision has been reached by the end of six weeks). The time frame associated with habeas matches the intent of the Convention far better than ordinary federal procedural rules would. The fact that a treaty and a statute of the United States were involved strengthened the case for allowing habeas relief. The federal habeas statute predicates the grant on the character of the custody and specifically includes reference to a person "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. 2241(c)(3) (West 1994). It noted that at least one federal district court had applied the habeas procedure in a case under the Convention and ICARA, although it did not, at least in a published opinion, explain its reasoning for doing so. See Walton v. Walton, 925 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (S.D.Miss.1996) In view of the foregoing, the Court treated the petition as an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal habeas statute allows the Court to either award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. 2243. The statute requires the respondent to "make a return certifying the true cause of the detention" within three days unless for good cause additional time iis allowed. Id. After the return, a hearing must be set within five days (unless for good cause additional time is allowed). For the convenience of the parties and the Court, no written return or other pleading was required. Respondent was given permission to submit a written response to the Petition at or before the date of the hearing. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2243, the Court conducted a preliminary review of the application and it was not plainly apparent that Petitioner was entitled to no relief. The Court ordered Respondent to appear before the Court and show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue and why Jan should not be returned to Poland. Respondent was ordered to "produce at the hearing the body of the person detained," The Court stated it would hear evidence and argument in summary fashion and decide the case at the hearing, unless, for good cause shown, it finds reason for delay.

The decision cites, inter alia, Joel R. Brandes & Carole L. Weidman, International Child Abduction, N.Y.L.J., October 26, 1993, at 3.

  

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