In Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000), the husband who had earlier absconded to his native Ireland after being charged with criminal offenses in the United States petitioned for return of the children after they were taken to United States by his estranged wife. The District Court granted the petition, and after allowing the wife's sister to intervene on behalf of the children, denied a motion to dismiss on basis of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that: the sister's intervention was properly limited to the issue of applicability of the the fugitive disentitlement doctrine; the doctrine did not bar the husband from bringing his petition and grant of a stay pending appeal was proper. The wife made a showing that the return of the children to Ireland would expose them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm, as would bar their return under the Hague Convention.

Under the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine," courts will generally dismiss the civil or criminal appeal of a fugitive who is still on the lam. The doctrine does not allow a court in a civil forfeiture suit to enter judgment against a claimant because he is a fugitive from, or otherwise is resisting, a related criminal prosecution. The dismissal of a civil action pursuant to fugitive disentitlement doctrine requires that the plaintiff is a fugitive, his fugitive status has a connection to his civil action, and the sanction of dismissal is necessary to effectuate the concerns underlying doctrine, which include prejudice to the opponent, delay, frustration, and unenforceability.

While the husband was a fugitive, and there was arguably some connection between his fugitive status and his petition, practical considerations did not warrant application of doctrine, which would impose too severe a restriction on the husband's attempt to enforce his parental rights.

The wife who had wrongfully brought children to United States from their habitual residence in Ireland showed by clear and convincing evidence that children faced a grave risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm if they were returned to her husband in Ireland. The husband had a long history of spousal abuse, and of fights with and threats against persons other than his wife, including fight with one of his adult sons, and had shown a chronic disobedience of court orders.

Undertakings by the husband, or even a potential barring order by an Irish court, were not sufficient to mitigate the grave risk that the children would be exposed to physical or psychological harm if they were returned, and thus did not allow the return of the children. The husband had repeatedly violated court orders in both the United States and Ireland, and there was every reason to believe that he would violate undertakings, and any future orders of Irish courts.