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In re Walsh, 53 F.Supp.2d 91 (D. Mass. 1999)

 

In re Walsh, 53 F.Supp.2d 91 (D. Mass. 1999), on the mother's motion to dismiss the order granting relief, the District Court held that the fugitive dsentitlement doctrine was not applicable. The Irish father was not precluded, by the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, from petitioning for return of his children under International Abduction Remedies Act. He had fled the country four years earlier to avoid criminal allegations, not criminal conviction, and no extradition proceedings had been initiated.

The Court entered a Judgment granting his petition under the International Abduction Remedies Act requiring the return of his two young children to Ireland, their country of habitual residence. (In re the Application of John Walsh, 31 F.Supp.2d 200 (D.Mass.1998).

Under certain circumstances, the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement permits a court to dismiss proceedings brought before it by an individual who has challenged a court's dignity by fleeing its jurisdiction. This doctrine was potentially relevant because the petitioner fled the United States after he became the subject of a default warrant for assault with intent to murder in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

 

  

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