"child custody" "child support" New York Family Law"

 

 

 

   

                  New York Divorce and Family Law  

      nysdivorce.com    brandeslaw.com

The definitive site on the web for New York Divorce and Family Law.

 

 

[HOME]

[SITE MAP]

ARTICLES  BY SUBJECT

Adoption

Agreements

Alimony, Maintenance and Spousal Support

Child Abuse

Child Abduction

Child Custody and Parental Alienation

Child Support

Child Visitation

Common Law Marriage

Domestic Violence

Degrees and Licenses

Engagement Gifts

Enforcement

Grandparent Visitation and Non-Parent Visitation

Grounds For Divorce

International Child Abduction

Legal Fee Awards and Awards For Expenses

Litigation and Procedure

Marital Property

Property Distribution

Questions About Taxes

Retirement Benefits

Separate Property

Spousal Support

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

In K v. B, __AD3d__, 2004 WL 2525121, 2004 NY Slip Op 08003 (1st Dept., 2004) the husband argued on appeal that the wife "could not establish cruel and inhuman treatment as a ground for divorce since the parties did not cohabit." The Appellate Court affirmed the divorce stating that in determining whether cruel and inhuman treatment occurred, "the fact-finder should focus primary attention on the nature of the interaction between a husband and wife, rather than on the type of living arrangement." Supreme Court found sufficient proof that the husband committed "marital rape" more than once; that the husband wiretapped and monitored the wife's telephone conversations without her knowledge; that the husband accused the wife of adultery; that the husband threatened to ruin the wife's business; that the husband refused to discuss his finances with the wife, some of which involved projects which the wife was financing; that the husband engaged in "various financial maneuvers" which involved "surreptitiously" withdrawing money from joint accounts, selling stock and liquidating assets, including taking for his own benefit a $35,000 federal income tax refund check; that the husband suggested to the wife that she was mentally unstable and incapable of making decisions; that the husband wrote a "manipulative and intimidating" letter1 to the wife's therapist; that the husband engaged in a pattern of anger followed by withdrawal when the wife wanted to talk about her feelings concerning the parties' marriage and family; that the husband continually gave the wife "mean and frightening" stares; that the husband yelled at the wife, demeaned her and berated the wife when she tried to discuss serious issues with him; that the husband engaged in a long pattern of intimidation; and that when the wife was feeling "pressured" by her mounting, severe business problems, the husband remained upstate, refusing to spend any more time in New York City with her and their three children, despite her repeated requests. The Appellate Division held that these incidents, evincing a long-standing pattern of emotional neglect and abuse, were amply supported by the record and established cruel and inhuman treatment.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s distribution of the marital property 65% -35% in the wife's favor, the finding that the wife's law firm had no value, and finding the husband 50 percent responsible for those debts of the wife's business for which she may be held personally liable. It held that although the parties had a pre-marriage agreement requiring a 50 percent-50 percent division of all mutually held assets it was not acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded and was unenforceable, and the trial court properly rejected it as evidence.

The Appellate Division held that the Domestic Relations Law contemplates an equitable, not necessarily equal, division of marital assets based on the parties' respective contributions to the marriage. It is "based on the premise that a marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker". The distribution of marital assets depends not only on the financial contribution of the parties "but also on a wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home. Here, the evidence was abundant that the wife contributed significantly in every single category, and the husband hardly at all. It affirmed the trial court's unequal distribution of marital property, as amply supported by the record, even were it not to consider any economic fault. The evidence established that the wife undertook the herculean combined roles of full-time lawyer, primary homemaker and primary parent of the three children, all with, at best, marginal help and support from their father.

While originally the wife did agree to that unorthodox arrangement, she nevertheless continued to work full time, provided the lion's share of the family's financial support, and reared their three children virtually alone. They did agree that if both parents were working full time, they would jointly share responsibility for child rearing. Here, the wife worked full time and assumed virtually all child-rearing responsibility, while the husband dabbled in his projects and assumed virtually none of the child-rearing responsibility. During the time the wife was earning an excellent living, even though she was simultaneously and almost singlehandedly raising the children. The husband gave very little, both financially and domestically, to his marriage and his family. After her law partner was suddenly killed in 1996, the wife became solely responsible for the operation of the debt-ridden law firm. Under the enormous pressure of trying to salvage the firm by herself in the wake of her partner's death and, further, upon the consequential discovery that the firm had other significant liabilities, all while at the same time raising and trying to nurture their three children, the wife asked her husband for help. He refused to offer any assistance, be it financial, emotional or otherwise.
The Court found that the husband's reliance on the parties' pre-marriage agreement became increasingly indefensible and illogical with the birth of each of his three children. The husband's indifference clearly justified the unequal distribution of marital assets awarded by the court, not as a punitive consequence, but, rather, as a factually supported reflection of the actual contributions each spouse made to the existence and survival of the marriage and in fulfillment of their respective roles as parents and partners.
The husband criticized Supreme Court's determination that economic fault

(see Domestic Relations Law §236B[5][d][11] and §236B[5][d][13] warranted a greater distribution of marital assets to the wife. The Appellate Division found that based on these most unusual circumstances, the record supported an unequal distribution of assets based solely on the parties' respective, unequal contributions to the marriage. Supreme Court specifically and correctly cited, in addition to the wife's financial contributions, her "contributions as the primary homemaker and caretaker, particularly her assumption of almost all responsibility for child-rearing" as a basis for awarding the wife the greater share of marital assets. Its finding concerning that the husband's relentless appropriation of money, including money set aside for his children's education, and conversion of personalty, for his own purposes while ignoring his wife's pleas for financial and emotional assistance, further supported the trial court's conclusion that an unequal distribution of property was fair and legally justified.

The husband refused the wife's request to sell off some real estate holdings to produce some much needed cash. The husband also admitted that he withdrew money from an escrow account in violation of a court order. Against this backdrop of financial misconduct, it did not matter whether the husband's actions in filing a claim for Innocent Spouse Relief was inappropriate, as the trial court found.
The husband argued that the court improperly imputed a $60,000 annual income to him for child support purposes. The Appellate Division Court held that Child support is based on a parent's ability to provide for his or her children, not necessarily the parent's current economic situation. Since the trial court considered the credible proof - specifically, the husband's possession of both an architect's and real estate broker's license and his extensive training and experience in both fields - and rendered a decision based on the proven facts and applicable law, there was no basis to disturb its reasoned and reasonable imputation of income to the husband.

At the end of his main brief and in a conclusory fashion the husband asserted that the matter must be remanded, among other reasons, to value the wife's law license. As he made no specific substantive argument which focused on the merits of this claim the court declined to consider it.